Models of two-level population processes are characterized by the types of individuallevel and group-level events that can occur, and the state-dependent rates at which they occur. By varying the model parameters that control intra-group assortment, migration rates, and group fission and extinction rates, we can study their individual and combined effects on the evolution of cooperation. We find that fission and extinction events "catalyze" the evolutionary process by providing a "shortcut" to the cooperative states. Group-level events allow cooperation to evolve under unfavorable conditions (e.g., low intra-group assortedness), and can greatly speed up the evolution when conditions are more favorable. Migration tends to slow down the evolution of cooperation, but (except in extreme cases) cannot stop it when group-level events occur sufficiently often. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of a model of hunter-gatherer tribes.
Introduction
Recently, dynamical equations in the form of partial differential equations (PDE's) have been derived for two-level population processes that allow detailed analyses of a wide variety of models (Simon, 2010; Simon, Fletcher & Doebeli, 2012; Luo, 2013) . It is now possible to include a wide range of individual-level and group-level events into the models, and thereby study the interplay between the resulting model parameters.
Here we study a generic two-level population process loosely based on populations of hunter gatherer tribes (distinct groups of "cooperators" and "defectors"). The models feature five kinds of biological events. At the individual level there are births, deaths, and migrations. At the group level there are fission events (when a group breaks into pieces that become new groups) and extinction events (when all the individuals in a group simultaneously die). The birth and death rates of the cooperators and defectors in a given group depend on the current composition of the group, and on a parameter that controls the intra-group assortment (the relative frequency that cooperators and defectors interact). The fission rate depends on the size of the group. The extinction rate depends on the size and composition of the group, and the total number of groups in the population.
With five different biological events in the model, there are quite a few parameters that can be varied. However, we will focus primarily on three important parameters. The other parameters will usually be fixed at values that we believe are in line with anthropological data for hunter gatherers (Bowles, 2006) . The three parameters we study in detail are:
1. r: a measure of assortment within the groups, often referred to as "relatedness".
2. ρ: a scaling parameter that controls the rates that fission and extinction events occur.
3. µ: the per-capita migration rate.
We also study the effects of selective extinction (when more-cooperative groups have lower extinction rates) and associative splitting (when fission events segregate cooperators and defectors to some degree). In the next section we decribe our generic model in more detail. Section 3 lists some general observations about these kinds of models that follow from our numerical experiments. We conclude the main part of the paper with some thoughts about the importance of group-level events in other examples of group-structured populations, and the importance of dynamics in evolutionary models. A more detailed discussion of the model can be found in the Appendix, and there are links to numerical animations of our dynamical equations, and the code that generated them, in the Methods section.
The Mathematical Model
The generic model will be described informally in this section, as this is enough to allow readers to understand the results that follow. Specific details of the model and its solution can be found in the Appendix.
The population in the model consists of groups comprised of cooperators and defectors. There are births and deaths of individuals within the groups. At the group level, there are also births and deaths via fission and extinction events. There are also migrations of individuals between groups.
At the individual level, cooperator/defector population dynamics within each group is based on a rule 3 that keeps the level of assortment 4 in each group, at all times, at a fixed level, r. In the context of the present model, which is loosely based on hunter gatherers, when r > 0 individuals "recognize" their own kind and interact with them disproportionately often. At the group level, the population is governed by a fission-growth-extinction process (Figure 1 ). The growth aspect of the group-level process is governed by the individual-level population processes within the groups, and the individual-level population processes terminate when the groups fission or die, so clearly events at the two levels are not independent. Mathematical models of two-level population processes like these can be analyzed with dynamical equations of the form
θ t (x, y) is the state variable, interpreted as the number of (x, y)-groups 5 in the population at time t.
The functions α c t (x, y) and α d t (x, y) characterize the cooperator/defector population process within the groups, respectively, including the effects of migration. The right side term, g t (x, y), characterizes the effects of all the group-level events. Equation ( In order to understand the main points in this article, it is only necessary to understand (intuitively) how the five biological events in the model-births, deaths, migrations, fissions, and extinctions-interact to drive the two-level population dynamics. Fission and extinction events are sufficient (and probably necessary) to cause the population behaviors we want to demonstrate; therefore, other group-level events, such as fusion and dispersal, are not included in the model.
Migration is explicitly included in the model because it was likely an important feature in early hunter gatherer populations, and because it is known to hinder the evolution of cooperation to some degree (Pinker, 2012) .
New groups-born from fission events-grow and change in composition (defectors always have higher birth rates in the model) until they either fission into two pieces or die of extinction.
One or the other eventually happens to every group. The group growth rate slows as it reaches an "equilibrium size", much like logistic growth. The equilibrium size depends on the composition of the group, and therefore changes slowly in time. Individuals in the model migrate away from their groups at a fixed rate µ, and join another group selected at random.
Birth rates for the cooperators and defectors in a given group are based on the (state dependent) expected payoffs from a prisoner's dilemma game. Fission rates are chosen so that larger groups are more likely to fission than smaller ones. The class of fissioning densities 7 used in the model allows cooperators and defectors to "segregate"
(to some extent) during a fission event. This is sometimes referred to as "selective assortment"
or "associative (tribe) splitting" (Haldane, 1932; Wright, 1943; Aoki, 1982; Bowles, 2006) . The 6 It is not clear how one would express Hamilton's rule for two-level processes like ours, because the group-level events make defining (let alone calculating) individual-level costs and benefits very difficult. 7 The fissioning density specifies the statitstics of the fissioned pieces in terms of the composition of the parent group. extinction rate function increases with the total number of groups, decreases with the size of the group, and decreases with the prevalence of cooperators in the group, i.e. "selective extinction" (Hamilton, 1975; Bowles, 2006) . In some of our examples, selective extinction and associative splitting are "turned off" by setting certain parameters to zero. In our numerical experiments, the fission rate and extinction rate are scaled together by a parameter ρ ≥ 0, where ρ = 0 corresponds to no group-level events.
Setting all the biological events in motion yields the two-level population process. There are links to numerical animations of our numerical experiments in the Methods section. There is also a catalog of animations of similar dynamics in Simon and Nielsen, 2012, including animations of a continuous-time Markov chain version of (1), which illustrates two-level population dynamics in a different way.
Results
We set the model parameters to values that yield individual-and group-level event rates based on reasonable estimates for hunter-gatherer populations (Bowles, 2006) . This is our "benchmark model" (details in Appendix A2). We then varied intra-group assortment via r, group-level event rates via ρ, and the migration rate via µ, and observed how they affect the evolutionary trajectories. The main conclusions from our mathematical analysis and numerical experiments can be summarized as follows:
1. Group-level events "catalyze" individual-level processes by creating a "shortcut" to the cooperative states. In fact, the catalytic effect is strong enough in our model so that cooperation can sometimes evolve even when r = 0.
2. Group-level events can be powerful catalysts even without selective extinction and associative splitting.
Fission and extinction events can have a profound effect even when their rate functions are symmetric with respect to cooperators and defectors. One explanation for this (perhaps) unexpected result resides in the interplay between (individual-level) birth rates and (grouplevel) extinction rates. In our model, small cooperative groups grow faster than small uncooperative groups, and are therefore more likely to escape the extinction process which disproportionately targets small groups. There may be other subtle factors that also contribute to the effects of group-level events.
3. Group-level events can counter a sizable migration rate.
The reason usually given to explain how migration undermines the evolution of cooperation in group-structured populations is that the occasional cooperative group that emerges will be "contaminated" by migrating defectors, whose descendents will dominate the group. Mutant defectors born in a cooperative group would have the same effect. However, the nullifying effect of migration (or mutation) has not been studied before in models taking group-level events into account. Our results imply that the nullifying effects were overstated ( Figure 4 ).
Fixation (of cooperators or defectors) does not necessarily occur in group-structured populations.
In the absence of group-level events, the population equilibrium consists of either all cooperators or all defectors, depending on whether or not Hamilton's rule is satisfied within the groups. However, when ρ > 0, the typical equilibrium is a complicated mixture of groups of various sizes and levels of cooperation. Cooperation can often establish itself at small but stable levels even when conditions seem quite unfavorable; and likewise, a small population of defectors can remain in equilibrium even when Hamilton's rule favors cooperators within the groups.
5. Too many group-level events can be harmful.
The model confirms that if ρ is too big, groups fission into smaller and smaller pieces which are then prone to extinction. The result is an "unhealthy" population, and extinction of the whole population is possible.
6. The population-wide level of assortment is typically higher than the intra-group level of assortment.
The level of intra-group assortment is kept fixed at the value r in our model by design, but the population-wide assortment, R t , is time dependent and is typically somewhat larger than r when the population is out of equilibrium. R t varies in complicated ways that can only be determined by solving (1) (details in the Appendix A3), so it is not easily controlled in numerical experiments. The more useful quantity appears to be r, since it naturally appears as an independent variable in the model.
Discussion
It is commonly thought that group-level events are of minor importance in the evolution of cooperation, due to the advantages defectors have over cooperators within groups (e.g. higher birth rates), the nullifying effect of migration, and the relative infrequency of group-level events compared to individual-level events. Even when cooperative groups have advantages over less cooperative groups, e.g. they grow faster and/or bigger, or are less likely to die of extinction, it is thought that the individual-level considerations are of much greater importance. There are many models of the evolution of cooperation in the literature that support this view, starting with the classic "haystack model" (Maynard-Smith, 1964). However, models that support this view invariably do not account for fission and extinction events, which are common in hunter-gatherer tribes, host/parasite populations, primative multicellular organisms, and many other examples of two-level population processes. Our results show that cooperation evolves relatively easily in group-structured populations with fission and extinction events. Even in the absense of group-level "favoritism" towards cooperators in the form of associative splitting or selective extinction, and in the absense of significant intra-group assortment, fission and extinction events can have a profound effect because they cause a kind of group-level diversity that catalyzes the evolution of cooperation. A dynamical model of group-structured populations, including all the important events at both levels, is needed to see and quantify the catalytic effect. A static analysis (Frank, 2013 ) of a group-structured population, for example, cannot see differences in the times required for cooperation to evolve in different models.
We demonstrated the catalytic effects of fission and extinction in a model based on huntergatherer tribes. However, these effects may be even more important in other contexts. With fission and extinction events, cooperation can evolve in more diverse conditions and in much less time than without them. This may be especially important for non-intelligent organisms (e.g. parasites and microbes), where cooperator-friendly mechanisms like reciprocal altruism and gene-culture co-evolution, Richerson and Boyd, (2005) , are obviously not possible.
Methods
Our numerical experiments involved solving the dynamical equation (1) partner of the same type (cooperator or defector) with probability r, and chooses a partner randomly from the whole group with probability 1 − r. In an (x, y)-group (a group with x cooperators and y defectors) it follows that the probability a cooperator plays a cooperator and a defector plays a cooperator are (respectively) P(C|C) = r + (1 − r) x x + y , and P(C|D) = (1 − r) x x + y , So P(C|C) − P(C|D) = r, which means that r is the relatedness within the groups as it is usually defined in the quantitative genetics literature. (Note that P(D|D) − P(D|C) = r as well.)
The payoffs for the Prisioner's Dilemma game have the form
where b and c are the benefit and cost associated with the behavior of cooperators 8 .
The expected payoffs for cooperators and defectors in an (x, y)-group are therefore
and
Birth rates of cooperators and defectors in an (x, y)-group are sβ c (x, y) and sβ d (x, y), where s > 0 is the birth rate parameter. The death rates for both cooperators and defectors in an (x, y)-group is proportional to the size of the group, i.e. d(x + y), where d > 0 is the death rate parameter. There is also migration in the model. Each individual migrates from its group at rate µ and joins another group at random. Let C and D be the total number of cooperators and defectors in the population (summed over all the groups), and let G be the number of groups. The total rate that cooperators migrate away from an (x, y)-group is µx, and the rate that cooperators migrate to a given group is Of course, the intra-group populations x and y are actually dynamical variables, x(t) and y(t), and likewise, the total populations, C t , D t , and G t are also functions of time. In this article birth and death rates are interpreted as deterministic rates 9 , which leads to a real-valued population process governed by the differential equations
Two things can happen to a group as it ages. It can die of extinction, which means all the individuals in the group sudenly die; or it can fission, which means it breaks into pieces that become new autonomous groups. The state of the whole population at time t is given by a density function θ t (x, y) where θ t (x, y)dydx can be thought of as the number of (x, y)-groups in the population at time t. Equation (1) governs the dynamics for θ t (x, y), Simon, 2010. Virtually any quantity associated with the model can be calculated from θ t (x, y); in particular,
xθ t (x, y)dydx, and
In the model, an (x, y)-group fissions at rate
where λ ≥ 0 is the fission rate parameter.
The extinction at rate in the model is
where e 0 ≥ 0 is the extinction rate parameter, and φ is the selective extinction parameter. Thus, 9 If we interpret the birth and death rates as stochastic rates then x(t) and y(t) are integer-valued, and the individuallevel population process is a continuous-time Markov chain, Simon, 2010. smaller groups are more likely to die, and groups are more likely to die when there are more groups to compete with. If φ = 1 then the extinction rate depends on the size of the group, but does not distinguish between cooperative and uncooperative groups. If φ > 1 then cooperative groups are favored.
When a group fissions the outcome is specified (statistically) by a fissioning density. A fissioning density is a function h ((x, y), (u, v) ) where h ((x, y), (u, v) )dydx is interpreted as the expected number of (x, y)-groups resulting from the fissioning of a (u, v)-group. For (u, v) fixed,
, whose integral over that region is equal to 2 (since a fission event results in two pieces), and whose mean is (x/2, y/2). The fissioning density used in the model is a weighted average of a uniform density and a discrete density, yielding a simple example of associative splitting. The "uniform" density, where all possible outcomes of the fissioning of an (x, y)-group are equally likely, is h 1 ((x, y), (u, v)) = 2 uv , and the discrete density is h 2 ((x, y), (u, v)) = δ ((x,y)=(0,v/2)) + δ ((x,y)=(u,y/2)) , where δ (·) is the delta function. In our model the fissioning density is
where ψ ∈ [0, 1] is the associative splitting parameter. When ψ = 0 there is no associative splitting, so the outcomes of fission events are random (uniform). When ψ = 1, all the cooperators end up in the same piece.
Finally, the initial condition for dynamical equation is based on a bivariate Normal density,
The density is truncated off the positive quadrant, so G 0 = R R θ 0 (x, y)dydx will be less than N 0 , especially if (C 0 , D 0 ) is close to one of the axes.
Solving the model means solving equation (1) using α c t and α d t from (2), and
where the first two terms on the right side are the fission and extinction rates from (4) and (5), and the third term is the rate that new (x, y)-groups are born due to larger groups fissioning. Even in the simplest examples there is no closed-form solution for (1), but the equation can be solved numerically without much difficulty (as long as one is patient). A single run yields θ t , t ∈ [0, T ], which can take from a few finutes to a few hours, depending on how big T is. The Matlab program we used for our numerical experiments is linked to in the Methods section.
A2: The Benchmark Model, and some "Back of the Envelope" Calculations text allow r, ρ, µ, φ, and ψ to vary. Note that in the benchmark settings, rb < c, so Hamilton's rule predicts (correctly) that cooperation cannot thrive without group-level events. However, there are group-level events in the benchmark model (ρ = 1.0), and cooperation establish itself quite easily in that case. Note also that G 0 , the initial number of groups is 384.75 in all our examples and not N 0 = 471.25. The reason for this is that since the initial group mean is so close to the y axis, a sizable fraction of the initial density is truncated.
The only way to determine the precise model dynamics and equilibrium configuration based on the model parameter setings is to solve equation (1). However, there are some simple heuristic calculations that give good estimates of some of the important quantities associated with the model, like stable group sizes, average group lifetimes, and group birth and death rates. These kinds of calculations allowed us to quickly calibrate the parameters to be in line with hunter gatherer dynamics. The following analysis consists of "back of the envelope" calculations, which can be useful for quick approximations.
Starting with the population dynamics within the groups, we can determine the approximate quilibrium group sizes from b, c, d, and s. In a group of mostly cooperators (y ≈ 0), the perindividual birth rate is sβ c (x, y) ≈ s(1 + b − c) which equals 0.0325 in our benchmark model. The total birth rate in the group is therefore about 0.0325τ c , where τ c is the equilibrium size of a group of cooperators. The per-individual death rate is dτ c , so in our benchmark model the total death rate in a group of cooperators is 0.0005τ 2 c . Since the total birth rate and total death rate are equal in equilibrium, we obtain τ c = 65. Likewise, a group of (mostly) defectors has a total birth rate of about 0.025τ d and a total death rate of 0.0005τ 2 d , we obtain τ d = 50. Groups with a mixture of cooperators and defectors will have an equilibrium size somewhere between 50 and 65. This is why the diagonal line between (0, 50) and (65, 0) appears to be a boundary in Figure 2 in the main text. For simplicity (precision is neither necessary nor possible in these kinds of calculations),
we will use τ = 60 as the size of a typical mature group in our numerical experiments. Thus, the per-individual death rate in a typical group is τd = 0.03, meaning that the average lifetime is about 1/τd ≈ 33 time units. If we accept that hunter gatherers lived a bit more that 30 years on the average then it follows that one time unit in the model corresponds to about 1 year.
Now that we know the time unit we can estimate how often other events occur. The benchmark migration rate is µ = .0025, which means that the probability an individual migrates away from the tribe in one year is about 1/400. In a group of 60 this means somebody is migrating away about once every 6.6 years. (And every group can expect a migrant to join them about once every 6.6.)
A group of size 60 will fission at rate 60λ = .015 per time unit; in other words it will take a group about 66 years on the average to fission after it reaches full size (if the group doesn't die of extinction first). Recall that smaller groups are less likely to fission in the model.
To estimate the average time a group lives before extinction (if it doesn't fission first) we need the equilibrium number of groups in the population. This quantity is difficult to estimate directly from the basic model parameters since the sizes of the groups in the population vary so much. However, we see from the numerical experiments that the equilibrium number of groups is typically around 400, which will suffice for our estimates here. If we use G = 400 then the extinction rate of a group of 60 is about e 0 · 400/60 2 = 1/360, which means a mature group can expect to live about 360 years if it doesn't fission first. However, a group of only 30 individuals has an extinction rate 4 times as large, and smaller groups are even more vulnerable. New groups (fissioned pieces) often start out small and therefore face the threat of extinction until they grow bigger.
The lifetime of a group is the time from when it is born until it either fissions or dies of extinction. We see that a mature group will fission after about 66 years on the average, if it doesn't go extinct first; and a mature group will die of extinction after about 360 years on the average, if it doesn't fission first. Another quantity of interest is the time it takes a fissioned piece to reach maturity. We can approximate the time using a logistic equation (since the growth is logistic)
where p e is the equilibrium population, p 0 is the initial population, and s = .025 is the birth rate scaling parameter. If we use p e = 60, as we do above, then a group of size p 0 = 25 needs about 64 years to reach size 50. Thus, the average time from when a new group is born from a fission event until it fissions (assuming it does not die of extinction first, and does not fission until it reaches maturity) is (roughly) the time a group of 25 takes to grow to size 50, plus the time a mature group takes to fission, which is 64 + 66 = 130 years.
A3: Intra-Group vs. Population-Wide Assortedness
The population dynamics within groups is designed so the level of assortnedness (relatedness) within every group, at all times, is r. However, the situation is not nearly as simple if one considers the population as a whole. The population-wide relatedness (as it is usually defined in the literature) can be computed from θ t (x, y), but it is a rather complicated and unintuitive quantity. The population-wide assortedness (relatedness) is not used in any way in this article, but for completeness and to satisfy curious readers it is derived next.
Letθ t (x, y) = θ t (x, y)/G t , where G t is the number of groups at time t given by (3). Thus, θ t (x, y) is a proper probability density which can be interpreted as the probability a randomly chosen group is an (x, y)-group. Letθ c t (x, y) = xθ t (x, y)/C t and θ d t (x, y) = yθ t (x, y)/D t be the states of the population as seen by a random cooperator and defector, respectively, where C t and D t are given by (3). The probability a random cooperator is paired with another cooperator at time t is therefore R R θ c t (x, y)(r + (1 − r)
x x+y )dydx and the probability a random defector is paired with a cooperator at time t is
x x+y dydx. Thus, at time t,
where E t is expectation with respect to the densityθ t , and X and Y are the (random) numbers of cooperators and defectors in a group chosen randomly from the population at time t. Since C t = E t (X) and D t = E t (Y ), the population-wide assortedness at time t is
which is time dependent, and has no obvious connection with whether cooperation is increasing or decreasing in the population at time t. Starting with a population of about 385 (2, 48)-groups, the states of the groups move in unison (slowly) down the diagonal line corresponding to equilibrium sized groups, towards the cooperative states. The number of groups stays constant since there are no group-level events. The bottom row shows the same example at the same time epochs, except that fission and extinction events occur at the benchmark rates (ρ = 1.0). Due to the group-level events, the population takes a "shortcut" to the cooperative states, and gets there in much less time. If r was below Hamilton's threshold in this example, the population in the top row would move in the other direction, pressing against the y axis, as the cooperators go extinct. However, the bottom row would look very similar (unless r ≈ 0) since ρ = 1.0 is sufficient to catalyze the individual-level process (Figure 3 ). There are links to full animations of the evolutionary trajectories for these and other examples in the Methods section. for an initially uncooperative population to reach 50% cooperators as a function of the migration rate for various combinations of r and ρ. Clearly migration always makes the evolution of cooperation more difficult, but it is not necessarily fatal. Even when r < 0.25 (top row) cooperators thrive if µ is below a threshold. The threshold (of course) depends on ρ. The benchmark migration rate of µ = .0025 corresponds to an individual migrating to or from each (equilibrium-sized) group every 3.3 years on the average (see Supplementary Information). When r ≥ 0.25 (bottom row), even high rates of migration (beyond the range seen here), cannot prevent the evolution of cooperation.
